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STUDENT COMMENT
The Reunification of China: An Examination
of the Legal Systems of the People's
Republic of China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan
I. A HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE CHINAS
The Chinese empire has existed in one form or another for over 2,000
years.' Many battles have taken place on her soil and many different
countries have laid claim to her resources. The concept of nationalism is
so deeply ingrained in her people that even in her present divided state,
reunification remains a primary objective for all Chinese.2 Now, as we
face the turn of the millennium, there seems to be a possible hope that all
of China may once again become reunited.
The most recent attempt at reunification began in 1975 when Pre-
mier Zhou Enlai introduced the "Four Modernizations Program"
designed to help bring the People's Republic of China (PRC) into the
global economy. 3 To achieve this modernization the PRC followed an
"open economic policy" which included the expansion of the PRC's for-
eign trade and importation of a large quantity of advanced technology
and equipment from the developed world." Keeping in line with this new
open economic policy, the PRC subsequently adopted a new political pos-
ture towards the reunification of China calling for the "peaceful reunifica-
tion" instead of "liberation" of Taiwan and Hong Kong.6 A new Constitu-
tion was ratified in 1983 which reflects not only this economic openness
but the hope for reunification as well.' The new Chinese Constitution le-
1. Young, Observations on the Importance of Law in China, 1988 B.Y.U. L. Rzv. 501,
508 (1988).
2. Id. See generally REPUBLIC OF CHINA (H. Chang ed. 1983) (hereinafter CHINA).
3. Valauskas, China's Special Economic Zones, 9 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 152,
163-65 (1986). The "Four Modernizations" were to be carried out in two stages. Stage one
was to build an independent industrial and economic system. The second stage was to ac-
complish the modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and tech-
nology before the end of the century.
4. Id. at 164.
5. M. LASATER, POLICY IN EVOLUTION: THE U.S. ROLE IN CHINA'S REUNIFICATION 29
(1988).
6. See generally THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1983), re-
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gitimized the newly formed Special Administrative Regions (SARs) by
providing for their autonomy in Article 31.' The first of these regions was
the Shekou Industrial Zone near Hong Kong.8 Many more SARs have
been established by Premier Zhao who expanded the economic autono-
mous regions in an effort to increase development near the Chinese coast.
As of 1988, nearly 300 cities and counties had been opened to the possi-
bility of direct integration into the pacific and global economies.9
During this time of economic openness on the mainland, the British
began facing the inevitable expiration of their lease on Chinese territory
near Hong Kong in 1997. Without these leased territories, Hong Kong
would be unable to sustain its population and would loose its position as
one of the financial capitals of the world.' For this reason, the British
entered into negotiations with the PRC and promulgated the Joint Decla-
ration of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Gov-
ernment of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
on the Question of Hong Kong (Joint Declaration) in 1984." This agree-
ment in effect transfers the sovereignty of Hong Kong from the British to
the PRC in 1997. Under the terms of the Agreement, Hong Kong will
become a Special Administrative Region which will retain a "high degree
of autonomy" for a period of fifty years."
Soon after the signing of this agreement the PRC issued a declara-
tion which indicated their intent that this agreement would pave the way
for the reunification of the Republic of China, Taiwan (Taiwan) with the
PRC. The declaration was entitled the "Nine-Points Plan" and effectively
reiterated the "one China, two systems" approach adopted in the Joint
Declaration.' s The terms of this proposal mirror the Hong Kong Joint
printed in, The Constitution of the People's Republic of China, 3 CONSTITUTIONAL COM-
MENTARY 5 (1988) (hereinafter PRC CONST.).
7. Id. art. 31.
8. Valauskas, supra note 3, at 185.
9. Fincer, Zhao's Fall, China's Loss, 76 FOREIGN POL. 3, 18 (1989).
10. Note, The Reversion of Hong Kong to China: Legal and Practical Questions, 21
WILLAMErTE L. REv. 327, 333 n.36 (1985). Without the cooperation of the PRC, Hong Kong
would not be able to survive because of lack of basic resources such as water and an airport.
11. See generally Agreement on the Future of Hong Kong, Sept. 26, 1984, United King-
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland-People's Republic of China, reprinted in 23
I.L.M. 1366 (hereinafter "Agreement").
12. See id. art. 27 and Annex I.
13. M. LASATER, supra note 5, at 103-04. The nine points include:
1. Talks between the CPC and the KMT regarding reunification;
2. facilitate the exchange of mail, trade, air, and shipping services and visits by
relatives and tourists as well as academic, cultural, and sport exchanges, and
reach an agreement thereupon;
3. after reunification, Taiwan can enjoy a high degree of autonomy as a SAR
and can retain its armed forces. The central government will not interfere with
local affairs;
4. Taiwan's current socio-economic system will remain unchanged, so will its
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Declaration in most respects; however, the Plan offers Taiwan more au-
tonomy with regard to international affairs and defense than the Joint
Declaration with Hong Kong.' 4
Unfortunately for the PRC, the Taiwanese did not respond favorably
to the offer. Since the revolution, Taiwan has maintained a policy of
"Three No's" with regard to the mainland: No contacts, no talks, no com-
promise.1" As recently as 1989, the Taiwanese were still espousing this as
their official position toward the PRC; 6 however, the recent lifting of
travel and trade restrictions to the PRC by Taiwan is an indication of a
possible new political force in Taiwan. 17 Also, in an effort to appear rea-
sonable toward the PRC, the government in Taiwan has developed its
own reunification plan: "One country, two equal governments.' 8 While,
Taiwan feels this is the ideal model of transition for handling the rela-
tionship between the two sides before reunification, a closer look reveals
this is really no change from the present situation."' Both governments
hold that there is only one China, and at the present time, there are two
governments. The difference is that under this system, Taiwan would be
able to participate in international organizations as an equal with the
PRC and receive recognition as a legitimate government of China from
other countries. The mainland firmly rejects this proposal because they
way of life and its economic cultural relations with foreign countries;
5. people in authority in Taiwan may take up posts of leadership in national
politics;
6. when Taiwan's local finances are in difficulty, the Central Government shall
help out as they see fit;
7. there will be no discrimination against Taiwanese who want to settle on the
mainland. They will have the freedom of entry and exit from the mainland;
8. businessmen will be allowed to invest in the mainland and their interests
and profits are guaranteed; and
9. the reunification of the "motherland" is the utmost priority and should be
accomplished above all else. We charge the Kuomintang with pursuing this
goal through meaningful dialogue and compromise.
14. Id. at 132.
15. Id. at 114.
16. Christ. Sci. Mon., Feb. 23, 1989, at 7, col. 3.
17. N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1989, at 4, col. 3. Since Taiwan has eased travel restrictions to
the PRC, over 400,000 Taiwanese have visited the mainland as well as a limited number of
student groups from the PRC which have been allowed to visit Taiwan. See also Taiwan
Allows Citizens to Visit Relatives in China, L.A. Daily Journal, Oct. 15, 1987, at 9, col. 1.
18. Jiaquan, Taiwan's New Mainland Policy Raises Concern, BEIJING REv.,May 22-28,
1989, at 23. The basic differences between this and the PRC's "one country, two systems"
are these. First, Taiwan's plan advocates that both the PRC and Taiwan hold their own
independent sovereignty. Second, the relationship between the PRC and Taiwan would be
equal. Neither government would be servient to the other. Third, this idea of two equal
governments is one for a transitional period only. In the long run, there would be only one
country and one government.
19. Id.
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feel sovereignty can vest itself in only one government."0 While the official
line of the Taiwanese towards the PRC has not changed, more moderate
rhetoric is being espoused by the heads of state. As stated by Shao Yu-
ming, head of Taiwan's information bureau on October 13, 1988, "[our]
position vis-a-vis the mainland [is] security, non-governmental contacts,
no direct contacts, contact limited to civil affairs, and gradual progress."'
1
As positive relations continue to grow between the PRC and Taiwan,
the Hong Kong Basic Law Drafting Committee (BLDC) has been com-
pleting some important sections of the Basic Law for the new Hong Kong,
SAR.2 2 The Joint Declaration states clearly that in the new Hong Kong,
SAR, the executive shall be accountable to the legislature, yet the Basic
Law as drafted does not give any power of accountability to the Legisla-
ture. Even their power of impeachment must be approved by the PRC.
2 3
These variations from the Joint Declaration are beginning to make the
citizens of Hong Kong very nervous regarding the PRC's promise of "a
high degree of autonomy" for the region.
2 4
On the mainland, the PRC has been experiencing some problems of
its own in the form of an overheated economy, inflation, unemployment,
bottlenecks in energy, raw materials and transportation, and income dis-
parities.2 5 The general dissatisfaction of the populous, along with the stu-
dents' cries for greater political freedom, lead to the demonstrations in
Tienanman Square in April and May of 1989. The frustration of the gov-
ernment with the slow progress of the modernization plan culminated in
the massacre of demonstrators on June 4, 1989. This nationwide crack-
down effectively closed the major trading cities to the full implementation
of Premier Zhao's coastal development policies.2 6 In retrospect however,
the crackdown had little effect on international business. Although the
events in Beijing weigh heavily on our minds, we need only remember
how quickly the demonstrations of 1987 faded from the forefront of world
politics to understand how this recent atrocity may impact future rela-
tions. U.S. business, usually a key indicator of the importance of world
events, has become increasingly confident about the stability of China's
20. Id. at 24.
21. Jiaquan, More on Reunification of Taiwan with the Mainland, BEIJING REV., Jan.
16-22, 1989, at 26.
22. Lau, Structure of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, 20
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 51, 57 (1988). See page 18 of this article for a more complete
assessment of the Basic Law. The complete text of both the first and second drafts of the
Basic Law are reprinted in 22 CHINESE L. & GOV'T, Fall 1989, at 12, 196 [hereinafter The
Basic Law].
23. Id. at 58.
24. Agreement, supra note 11, art. 27 and Annex I. See also Yu Shek, Basic Law -
Basic Problems, 40 FREE CHINA REV., Mar. 1990, at 24. Mr. Yu Shek states that a recent poll
noted that confidence in Beijing has fallen from 75 percent in the beginning of 1989 to 52
percent after the May 20th declaration of Martial Law in Beijing. A table of additional
statistics is reprinted in the article as well.
25. Lord, China and America: Beyond the Big Chill, 68 FOREIGN AFF. 1, 5 (1989).
26. Fincer, supra note 9, at 28.
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economy. It wavered slightly with Beijing's response to the student dem-
onstrations in early 1987, and all indications point to the market in China
returning to normal again 2 7 The recent visits by U.S. officials and the
lifting of martial law in China are merely the latest indications of nor-
malcy in the region.
While some indicators seem to point to the eventual reunification of
all of China, there are some important legal considerations which must be
explored. The remainder of this article will examine the legal systems of
the PRC, Hong Kong, and Taiwan in light of the proposed "one country,
two systems" model of reunification in the hopes of determining whether
irreconcilable differences exist which would prevent the eventual reunifi-
cation of all of China.
II. THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
The legal system in the PRC has gone through many changes in the
short time since the revolution. In the period immediately following the
ouster of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists, the PRC sought to rid itself of
foreign control over its land and assets. To do this they expropriated
large capital, industrial, and trade holdings and transferred ownership of
those holdings to the Government.2" During this period of isolation from
the world, the PRC did not have a well defined legal system to protect
private interests or individual rights. As it became increasingly evident to
the PRC that they could not remain isolated without falling hopelessly
behind the rest of the world in terms of technology and productivity, they
began to change their legal system from one which was primarily regula-
tory to a more formal legal system which mirrored those of Western coun-
tries.29 They believed the establishment of a formal legal system would
prompt the West to accept them as a responsible member of the world
economic community, thus opening the way for trade and economic de-
velopment within China.30
Because of China's prior occupations by industrialized nations, for-
eign direct investment in China has become synonymous with negative
attributes such as "arrogance, gunboat diplomacy, and religious prosely-
tizing."31 In an effort to change the way the populace views foreign invest-
ment and to change the way the rest of the world views the PRC, the
government introduced in 1975 a program entitled "the Four Moderniza-
tions." The program's goals include the building of an independent indus-
trial and economic system and the modernization of agricultural, indus-
27. Vause, Perestroika and Market Socialism: The Effects of Communism's Slow
Thaw on East-West Economic Relations, 9 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 213, 226 (1988).
28. Valauskas, supra note 3, at 161. Foreign owners were compensated for their hold-
ings, however, most of the money was retained by the government because of large tax debts
which were unpaid.
29. Id. at 172-73.
30. Id. at 174.
31. Id. at 159.
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trial, defense, and science industries before the end of the century.2
To better achieve these goals, the PRC adopted a new Constitution
in 1983 which included provisions for autonomous economic zones, as well
as fundamental rights for citizens and foreigners in the PRC. 3 One
should be wary of the longevity of this new PRC Constitution, however,
as the PRC has amended and adopted new Constitutions several times
over the past thirty years, usually for political expediency. 34
While the PRC has come a long way from its extreme socialist rheto-
ric of the past, history is one of the only measures of reality by which the
world judges the legitimacy of a government. In historical terms, the PRC
does not fare well. China has on numerous occasions promised different
indigenous groups special treatment and then reneged on its promises.
Examples of the PRC asserting its autonomy include the treatment of the
Shanghai capitalists in 1949 and the Tibetans in the early 1950's. The
capitalists in Shanghai were promised in 1949 that their forms of business
enterprise would be tolerated under the new socialist state that was being
established in China, but within five years they were effectively and in
some cases personally wiped out.35 In Tibet, the situation was quite simi-
lar. In the early 1950's, Tibet was promised autonomy in return for its
"peaceful liberation." By the mid-1950's, PRC military forces occupied
Tibet, and the Tibetan independent militia was disbanded under the di-
rection of the PRC army.36 It is these inconsistencies in the policies of the
PRC government that makes its current promises of increased economic
openness and autonomy for the SARs very tenuous.
A. Legal Philosophy
The Chinese people have inherited one of the oldest philosophical
histories of any people on the earth. The teachings of Confucius are still
ingrained in the values and morals of the people today. The Confucian
theories of li and fa form the core of Chinese legal thought. Li is a collec-
tion of customs which regulate social conduct. Fa are rules of law which
codified the edicts of the Imperial rulers. For the Chinese, li takes prece-
dence over fa because it encompasses normative rules of morality and
proper behavior.3 ' The reluctance of the PRC to formulate a formal legal
system has its roots in traditional Confucian morality which prefers social
32. Id. at 163-64. See also Christ. Sci. Mon., July 11, 1988, at 10, col. 1.
33. See PRC CONST., supra note 6, art. 67.
34. Lau, supra note 22, at 51.
35. Remarks, The Hong Kong Accords as a Model for Dealing with Other Disputed
Territories, 80 AM. Soc'Y INT'L PROC. 348, 351 (1986) (reported by Kevin M. Harris).
36. Id. at 357.
37. Woo, The Right to a Criminal Appeal in the People's Republic of China, 14 YALE
J. INT'L L. 118, (1989). See also Farina, Talking Disputes Into Harmony, 4 AM. U.J. INT'L L.
& POL. 137, 144 (1989). See generally Mushkat, The Transition from British to Chinese
Rule in Hong Kong: A Discussion of Salient International Legal Issues, 14 DEN. J. INT'L L.
& POL'Y 171 (1986).
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pressure to the use of force by the state."8 However, the recent influx of
foreign investment has caused the Chinese to adopt several business prac-
tices which are counter to this legal philosophy. Examples of this are the
adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and the United Nations Conven-
tion on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods.39 China's legal tra-
dition is to seek equitable solutions by bringing both parties into
harmony with each other and with society through the use of informal
discussions and negotiations.4 The acceptance of the two conventions
mentioned above means that Chinese contracts will now conform to
Western standards, and disputes will be settled through formal arbitral
channels.
Modernization is not the only influence which has impressed itself on
Confucian thought. Marxist/Maoist views of law and society have also
crept into China's legal system. Currently, the legal system retains Con-
fucian ideas regarding the formation of behavior through education and
adds some Marxist/Maoist ideas regarding a rational ordered society.4
This view, held by many scholars regarding the flexibility of the Chinese
legal system, is but one example of the Confucian influence. Professor
Horsley states, "[w]hile one can not go so far as to state categorically that
everything is negotiable in China, it is the case that Chinese laws may
often be viewed as flexible guidelines. If circumstances warrant and if ap-
propriate government approvals are obtained, special treatment can be
granted." 2
The PRC has also adopted some socialist views regarding the power
of Government. One of the most fundamental differences is that in the
PRC, legislative interpretation is the "primary and most important mode
of legal interpretation."4 The leaders of the PRC feel that since the Leg-
islature is the representative body of the people, it should decide how the
laws should be applied to the people. Judicial interpretation in Chinese
courts binds only the case under consideration. Additionally, the PRC
does not subscribe to the theory of stare decisis." Legal theory aside, the
Constitution, starting with the preamble, and continuing through the first
38. Woo, supra note 37, at 122.
39. Farina, supra note 37, at 147. See generally United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517,
T.I.A.S. No. 6997; United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, U.N. Doc. A/CoNF./97/18 reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 671 (1980).
40. Farina, supra note 37, at 139. Informal discussions reflect the Chinese desire to
avoid direct confrontation and preserve societal harmony.
41. Id. at 142.
42. Horsley, Comment on Laws and Legal Developments Affecting Foreign Investment
in China, 2 CHINA L. REP. 175, 177 (1988).
43. Fung, The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China: Problems of Interpretation, 37 INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 701, 703 (1988).
See also PRC CONST., supra note 6, art. 67.
44. Fung, supra note 43, at 703.
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several articles of the general principles section, sets out the basic form of
the political nature of the PRC as being pure Socialism.45 In this regard,
the PRC, as expressed by Professor Li Chang-Doe, has reaffirmed its
commitment to collective individualism stating that "the basic task of the
nation in the years to come is to concentrate its effort on socialist
modernization. 4
6
Whereas the Constitution in Articles 33 through 50 sets out the basic
rights of its citizens, it must be realized that individual rights are not
inherent in the PRC, they are realized only by the graciousness of the
state."7 Also, article 51 expressly limits those rights by declaring that, "..
. their freedoms and rights may not infringe upon the interests of the
state, of society and of the collective, or upon the lawful freedoms and
rights of other citizens."4 This article in essence subrogates the individ-
ual's free exercise of those rights by recognizing them only when they are
serving the state.4 9 This was most evident with the recent prosecution
and execution of participants in the freedom rallies in June of 1989.
While there is a tremendous Marxist/Maoist influence on the Chinese
legal philosophy, the system itself does retain the fundamental impor-
tance of national independence, equality, mutual benefit, and reference to
international law.
5 0
B. Views On International Law
Recently, as mentioned above, the PRC has increased its awareness
of international law. The PRC has always considered international trea-
ties as the primary source of international law. 1 Recent treaties con-
cluded by the PRC with other nations indicate an even greater willing-
ness on their part to participate in the international legal community.
The best indicia of these changing conditions is the approval by the PRC
of the supremacy clauses included in transnational contracts. These
clauses dictate that international treaty law will be supreme to domestic
law in the event of a conflict. Responding to this trend, one scholar wrote,
"in China treaties are superior to municipal law, so that a treaty inconsis-
tent with a [Chinese] law must be applied by Chinese organs, irrespective
of whether the treaty is entered into before or after the enactment of the
law."52 Unfortunately, this same respect for international business law
45. See generally PRC CONST., supra note 6, forward and general principles.
46. Id., forward (emphasis added). See also Note, Foreign Investment in China and its
Impact on Human Rights, 15 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 109, 115 (1989).
47. PRC CONST., supra note 6, arts. 33-50; Note, supra note 46, at 116.
48. PRO CONST., supra note 6, art. 51.
49. Note, supra note 46, at 116.
50. Farina, supra note 37, at 143.
51. Mushkat, supra note 37, at 189; Remarks, supra note 35, at 352. The principle of
pacta sunt servanda is hailed by the Chinese as an important factor in treaty law.
52. Chiu, Chinese Attitudes Toward International Law in the Post-Mao Era, 1978-
1987, 21 INT'L LAW. 1127, 1149 (1987), quoting Li Haopei, A Comparative Study of the
Internal Application of Treaties, The Symposium on Chinese and European Concepts of
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has not been extended to the area of human rights. The PRC is not a
signatory to any of the international covenants on human rights.5 3
C. Recent Changes In PRC Law
Several recent legal changes in the PRC are excellent examples of
their increased willingness to cooperate with foreigners in the areas of
foreign investment and joint ventures.
In the late 1970's, the PRC developed a system of Special Adminis-
trative Regions. These regions are endowed with several autonomous fea-
tures which make investment very lucrative for foreigners." The purposes
of these zones are to attract foreign investment, facilitate the importation
of modern technology, improve Chinese managerial skills, expand foreign
trade, and increase foreign exchange earnings. 5 While given increased au-
tonomy in business and economic affairs, the SARs are still tied very
closely to the central government." The SARs also suffer from typical
bureaucratic problems such as lack of detail and clarity in their regula-
tions as well as labor problems which tend to make them less inviting to
foreign investors."
Along with the SARs, the PRC also adopted several new laws regard-
ing Joint Ventures which were designed to make investing in the PRC
easier and more profitable.58 In a final attempt to simplify dealings with
Law 3 (Hong Kong Arts Center, Mar. 20-25, 1986).
53. Note, supra note 46, at 111. See generally Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. Res 217A, Sec. III., 3 U.N. GAOR (Resolutions, Pt. 1) at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948);
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res 2200, 21 U.N.
GAOR (Supp. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, G.A. Res 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR (Supp. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
54. Fenwick, Evaluating China's Special Economic Zones, 2 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW.
376 (1984). Note, Special Economic Zones in the People's Republic of China, 13 SYRACUSE
J. INT'L L. & CoM. 345 (1986). See generally Valauskas, supra note 3.
55. Fenwick, supra note 54, at 377; Note, supra note 54, at 349.
56. Regulations on Special Economic Zones in Guangdong Province, art. 12. It reads:
[A~ll sovereign rights within a special zone . . . are controlled by our govern-
ment. All units of enterprises and undertakings and personal activities within
the special zones must abide by the laws of China. All administrative matters
are handled by the Administrative Committee for Special [Economic] Zones..
• . [Tihe direction of economic development of these zones and the construc-
tion of enterprises and undertakings must be examined and approved by the
Special Zone Development Corporation.
See also Fenwick, supra note 54, at 381.
57. Id. at 392. The lack of detail in the regulations leaves some very crucial administra-
tive items to be decided by the committee on a case-by-case bases. While this may be the
preferred method of dispute resolution for the Chinese, foreign businesses are very wary of
the possible results. Also, the labor force available in the SAR's are not productive due to
the lack of incentive in the socialist system. Requests by the foreign owners to promote
efficiency and productivity by rewarding their employees with bonuses and penalizing the
underproductive met with strong opposition from the bureaucracy who feel "uneasy with
the extraordinary leeway accorded zone investors."
58. Au, The Hopes and Fears of Foreign Direct Investment, 2 J. CHINESE L. 359, 363
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the PRC, the Central Committee passed a series of new State Secret
Laws." The new laws recognize that a state secret should be limited only
to material that has a specific reason to be kept secret. Previously, all
material was considered secret unless specifically deemed public. Under
the new law, the presumption has shifted toward free access.60 For for-
eigners attempting to negotiate with the Chinese, one of the major obsta-
cles has always been extracting legal, economic, and other relevant infor-
mation from government officials. With these new laws, access to
information is one problem which should not stand in the way of success-
ful business negotiations.6
The advent of these new changes in the PRC's approach to foreigners
and international cooperation signal an important change in legal atti-
tudes in the PRC. No longer insisting that they have absolute control
over every aspect of their country, they seem to be content to control the
social and political aspects and let the market control the economic
forces.
III. THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN HONG KONG
The island of Hong Kong was ceded to Great Britain as a result of
the Opium Wars in the 19th century. 2 To obtain sufficient resources to
maintain the island, Great Britain entered into a lease with the Chinese
for additional territory on the mainland adjacent to the island. This lease
expires in 1997. Loss of these additional territories would represent a
ninety-two percent loss in land control and would completely devaluate
Hong Kong as a financial center. 63 As a result, former Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher and Premier Deng Xiaoping agreed after their meet-
ing in September 1982, to open negotiations regarding the fate of Hong
Kong. Both agreed their primary goal was the maintenance of stability
and prosperity in Hong Kong."4 Two years of subsequent negotiations
culminated in the signing of the Joint Declaration on the future of Hong
Kong by the governments of Great Britain and the PRC. 5
(1988). The Joint Venture Laws include, "The Law of the People's Republic of China on
Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment" passed July 1979, and, "The Regu-
lations for the Implementation of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Joint Ven-
tures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment" passed Sept. 20, 1983. See also Valauskas,
supra note 3, at 175.
59. Gelatt, The New Chinese State Secret Laws, 22 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 255, 257 (1989)
(the texts of the new laws are reprinted in this article).
60. Id. at 255.
61. Id. at 256.
62. Note, supra note 10, at 327. Great Britain backed the Opium trade in order to solve
their trade deficit problems with China.
63. Id. at 333 n.36. Without the cooperation of the PRC, Hong Kong would not be able
to survive because of lack of basic resources such as water and an airport.
64. Bundy, The Reunification of China with Hong Kong and its Implications for Tai-
wan, 19 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 271 (1989).
65. See generally Agreement, supra at 11.
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A. Current Legal Structure
Before examining the future of Hong Kong, it would be useful to re-
view the current legal structure to better appreciate the breadth of the
changes in store for Hong Kong. Under the terms of the Joint Declara-
tion, the current legal system will remain intact until 1997.66 A precise
definition of the current legal system is debatable, even among British
scholars. As Britain's Financial Secretary Sir Phillip Haddon-Cave stated
in 1974, "[e]ssentially, the Hong Kong style [of government] is govern-
ment by consultation and consent. 6
There are three documents which convey authority to govern Hong
Kong and its adjoining territories. They are the Order of Council, Letters
of Patent, and Royal Instructions." The Order of Council defines the
boundaries and jurisdiction of the governing bodies in Hong Kong. " The
Letters of Patent create the Office of the Governor as well as the Execu-
tive and Legislative Council. The Letters also delineate the specific pow-
ers of the Governor. 0 The Royal Instructions outline the duties of both
the Executive and Legislative Councils."' In addition to granting power,
these documents also express the limits of power to be exercised by the
government in Hong Kong. Specifically, they note that the British Parlia-
ment has the power to make laws binding on Hong Kong. However, by
convention, this procedure is rarely used unless Great Britain wants to
unify a particular law in all of its territories.7 2
The Governor is by far the most powerful official in the colony. The
Letters of Patent give the Governor the power to make laws, give land
grants, appoint judges, and dismiss officers of the government."3 The Gov-
ernor is appointed by the Crown and relies only upon recommendations
and public opinion to decide what course of action to take in any given
situation.7 4
Aside from the Governor, there are three additional governing bodies.
Two of these bodies, the Executive Council and the Legislative Council,
serve as advisors to the Governor. The third body, the Urban Council, has
been granted limited authority to control certain domestic issues.
The members of the Executive Council are appointed by the Crown.
Membership is customarily limited to ten people and their duties include
66. Remarks, supra, note 33, at 351. See also Agreement, supra note 11, art. 4.
67. Speech to the Hong Kong University Economics Society, Sunday Post-Herald, 27
January 1974, reprinted in N. MINERS, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF HONG KONG 255
(1981).
68. N. MINERS, supra note 67, at 65.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 66,67.
72. Id. at 70.
73. Id. at 65.
74. Id. at 78.
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making recommendations to the Governor on substantive legal issues75
The Legislative Council, consisting of approximately fifty-two members
appointed by the Crown, votes on issues which the Governor raises.7 6
Since the 27 official members of the Council are compelled to vote with
the Governor, who has the ability to break any ties in the Legislative
Council, the unofficial members can never move the Council in opposition
to the Governor. However, control is not the purpose of the Council. The
Council is used mainly as a forum in which the Governor puts forward
ideas for future policy changes and the unofficial members point out
where they find these policies insufficient or harmful to the population. 77
Conversely, the Urban Council functions with some autonomy from
Great Britain and the Governor. The Urban Council has developed out of
a local administrative council to become the controlling body for local
issues. It is the only body whose unofficial members are elected by the
public. As of 1983, fifteen members have been appointed by the Governor
and fifteen members have been elected as representatives of the people.78
The functions of the Council include the licensing of businesses with re-
gard to environmental and health issues, maintenance of recreation facili-
ties, and administration of cultural services.7 The Council receives sev-
enty-five percent of its operating budget from the Legislative Council and
the other twenty-five percent from park fees. The Urban Council is able
to use the funds at their discretion as long as the expenditures remain
within their statutory power.80
Even though there are no elected representatives in the Legislative
and Executive Councils, the people of Hong Kong do wield some influ-
ence over the decisions of the Governor. Pressure groups consisting pri-
marily of members of the business community are able to express their
views regarding important issues before the issues are formally presented
in the Council sessions. This unofficial public referendum is held to avoid
possible contested votes in the Councils.8 ' It is through this process that
consultation and consent of the governed is obtained.
B. Legal Philosophy
Under British common law theory, the purpose of the law is to pro-
tect the individual from the tyranny of the government; therefore, laws
are codified with the intent of minimizing arbitrary conduct by power
75. Id. at 81.
76. The Executive and Legislative Councils on July 26, 1990, endorsed the British ad-
ministrations position that 20 seats (one-third) of the Legislative Council should be directly
elected by 1991. See Yu Shek, supra note 24, at 28.
77. N. MINERS, supra note 67, at 164.
78. Id. at 224-25.
79. Id. at 225.
80. Id.




holders.8 2 The Hong Kong government incorporates this idea in its sys-
tem of advisory councils. As in Great Britain, there are no specific statu-
tory safeguards for the fundamental rights of the people. The watchful-
ness of the Council members is assumed to be sufficient to protect the
people from overburdening restrictions by the Governor. 3 Also mirroring
the British system is the make-up of the judiciary. Unlike the United
States, Hong Kong Courts do not have the power of judicial review. Once
an act is passed by the Governor, it is assumed to be in line with the
Constitutional documents. Unless and until the act is overruled by the
British Parliament, the judiciary is required to enforce it.84
C. The Basic Law of Hong Kong, SARI"
During negotiations with Great Britain, the PRC insisted on the
complete restoration of Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997 and
rejected any British administrative role after that date." However, the
British insisted that the current economic system in Hong Kong remain
intact for at least fifty years after 1997. Several specific provisions were
included in the Joint Declaration which will not only insure Chinese sov-
ereignty but also the maintenance of the capitalistic society in Hong
Kong.8 7 Under the terms of the Joint Declaration, Hong Kong will be-
come a Special Administrative Region (SAR) under Article 31 of the 1982
PRC Constitution. The post 1997 SAR, known as Hong Kong-China, will
be vested with executive, legislative, and independent judicial power, in-
cluding that of final adjudication. 8 Even though provisions were made in
the Joint Declaration to insure Hong Kong's autonomy, the extent of that
autonomy will be decided by the creation of a mini-constitution which is
being drafted for Hong Kong by the Basic Law Drafting Commission
(BLDC) - all members of which were appointed by the PRC. 9
There are several specific guarantees which were negotiated into the
Joint Declaration to protect the people and their way of life. The first and
most important was the PRC's guarantee that Hong Kong would retain a
"high degree of autonomy, except in foreign and defence affairs." ' Also,
the PRC agreed that Hong Kong will be allowed an independent judiciary
82. Mushkat, supra note 37, at 174.
83. N. MINERS, supra note 67, at 67.
84. Id.
85. The complete texts of both the first and second drafts of the Basic Law have been
reprinted in, 20 CHINESE L. & Gov'T, Fall 1989, at 12, 196.
86. M. LASATER, supra note 5, at 109.
87. Id. See Agreement, supra at 11. See generally Turkel, One Country, Two Systems:
Hong Kong's Paradox of Politics and Business, 8 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 471
(1987); Jacobs, Hong Kong and the Modernization of China, 39 J. INT'L AFF. 63 (1986);
Castle, The Reversion of Hong Kong to China: Legal and Practical Questions, 21 WILLAM-
ETTE L. REV. 327 (1985).
88. Remarks, supra note 35, at 351. See also Agreement, supra note 11, Annex 1(1).
89. Remarks, supra note 35, at 352.
90. Agreement, supra note 11, art. 1(2).
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which includes the power of final adjudication. 1 Of final importance is
the guarantee by the PRC that the rights and freedoms of the people will
be maintained.9 2 The laws in Hong Kong are not to be changed, including
the common law principles used by the courts to make decisions.93 In
terms of economic relations, no taxes will be levied on Hong Kong and
their currency will remain freely convertible." ' Hong Kong is also to be
allowed to maintain and foster economic relationships with other coun-
tries, including maintenance of its seat in GATT and other international
economic bodies.9 5 In terms of international law, Hong Kong will continue
to be bound by the provisions of the Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights as well as the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 6
While the PRC continues to maintain that Hong Kong will retain its
economic independence, they are beginning to show signs of tightening
their political grip on the island. This is most evident in the drafts of the
basic law which have been released for review. The BLDC has completed
some important sections of the Basic Law. As it is drafted now, the Basic
Law enumerates the following powers to the executive:
1. The power to enforce the laws;
2. the power to approve or disapprove of the laws passed by the
legislature;
3. the power to carry out executive orders by the Government of the
PRO; and
4. the power to dissolve the legislature with the approval of the gov-
ernment of the PRC.9 7
The second draft of the Basic Law outlines the procedure for selecting
the Governor. The Basic Law calls for the formation of a representative
Election Committee which shall be composed of 800 members from all
sectors of the community. However, the membership of the committee
will not be elected by universal suffrage, they will be appointed by the
Central People's Government of the PRC.9 8
The Legislature, on the other hand, has been given limited power to
make and amend laws. As now drafted, the powers of the Legislature
include:
1. Making and amending laws according to the Basic Law;
91. Id. art. 1(3), Annex I(II).
92. Id. Annex I(XIII).
93. Id. Annex(II).
94. Id. art. 1, §§ 7-8.
95. Id. art. 1(9).
96. Id. Annex I(XIII). See generally International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, supra, at 53; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra,
at 53.
97. Lau, supra note 22, at 55.
98. The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's
Republic of China (Draft), 22 CHINESE L. & Gov'T, Fall 1989, at 106.
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2. amending and approving the financial budget; and
3. impeaching the chief executive in cases of serious breach of law and
gross dereliction of duty and to report to the government of the PRC
for action."
The Joint Declaration stated clearly that the executive, appointed by
the PRC, shall be accountable to the legislature which is elected from the
populous. Yet the Basic Law as drafted does not give any power of ac-
countability to the Legislature. 0 0 Even their power of impeachment must
be approved by the PRC. Comments by Premier Deng further illustrate
the PRC's tightening grip regarding the future of Hong Kong. One Chi-
nese newspaper reported that in a meeting with Premier Deng Xiaoping,
the BLDC was told by Premier Deng that the Basic Law should not be
too detailed and should not borrow wholesale from the West. He also
stated, "the people of Hong Kong should love both Hong Kong and
China," doubting whether, "elections by universal suffrage could produce
such patriots." He further declared that, "the doctrine of separation of
powers was unsuitable for Hong Kong" since this doctrine was for coun-
tries and Hong Kong was not a sovereign country.10 '
While the people of Hong Kong wait anxiously for the outcome of the
drafting sessions, Premier Deng has made it quite obvious that a "high
degree of autonomy" applies only to economic matters and that political
freedoms may have to be sacrificed.
IV. THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF TAIWAN
The Republic of China, Taiwan (ROC or Taiwan) came into exis-
tence as a result of the revolution of 1911. While the government was
officially formed after the revolution, significant resistance to the ROC
led to many domestic and international power struggles. In 1937, the Jap-
anese attacked the mainland thrusting the Chinese into World War II. At
the conclusion of the war, the Allied Powers restored the Chinese territo-
ries under Japanese occupation to the ROC. At that time, most countries
recognized the Republic of China under the leadership of President Chi-
ang Kai-Shek as the legitimate government of China. The government's
problems continued, however, because of an ever growing challenge to its
power from the communist insurgents. This challenge culminated in the
overthrow of the ROC government in 1949 and its subsequent withdrawal
from the mainland to the island provence of Taiwan where it now
resides.10 2
99. Lau, supra. note 22, at 57.
100. Id. at 58.
101. Id. at 59.
102. See generally CHINA, supra note 2, at 21-7.
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A. The Legal System
The Constitution of the ROC was promulgated on December 25,
1946, three years prior to its exile in Taiwan.103 The Constitution sets
forth a republican form of government consisting of a National Assembly
and five independent branches of government.' As a result of the Com-
munist Revolution on the mainland, the ROC passed "temporary provi-
sions" giving the President the power to suspend the mandates of the
Constitution and impose emergency rule over China. This provision was
instated in 1949 and is still in effect today. 05
The National Assembly is comprised of 2,691 elected members repre-
senting all of China. Because of the temporary provisions, the last full
election was held in 1947.106 Since the revolution, the government in Tai-
wan has claimed a right to govern all of China; therefore, mainlanders
representing the vast population on the mainland dominate the
Taiwanese central government. Since the middle of the 1970's, a gradual
"Taiwanization" of the political system has taken place. 10 7 Partial elec-
tions were called for by the President in 1969 and again in 1981 to fill
some vacancies left by mainlanders who had either died or retired.'0 8 Cur-
rently, there are approximately 1,152 members holding seats in the as-
sembly.'0 6 The functions of the Assembly include electing the President
and Vice President."0 The President in turn, serves as the head of state
and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The President can nego-
tiate treaties, declare war, and proclaim peace, as well as appoint and
remove civil servants."'
The five branches of the government serve to maintain a system of
checks and balances on the allocation of power in the government. The
Executive Yuan is headed by the Premier who is appointed by the Presi-
dent. The Premier serves as a liaison between the President and the Leg-
islature." 2 The functions of this branch include informing the Legislative
Yuan of administrative policies and plans of the President as well as be-
ing available to answer any questions regarding those policies. The Exec-
utive Yuan also has the duty of resolving disputes between any of the
103. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, reprinted in CHINA, supra note 2, at 425.
104. Id. at 425 (the five branches are: control, legislative, executive, examination, and
judicial).
105. Id. at 84. The only significant impact the provision has had on the government is
the suspension of full elections. Since the ROC still claims to rule over all of China, most of
the representatives in the Assembly are representatives of territories on the mainland. Since
elections can not be held in those territories, those members who were elected in 1947 are
still representatives today.
106. Id. at 87.
107. M. LASATER, supra note 5, at 114.
108. CHINA, supra note 2, at 88.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 87.
111. Id. at 91.
112. Id. at 95.
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other Yuans in the government. " '
The Legislative Yuan is comprised of 760 elected members from all
of China. Similar to the situation in the National Assembly, there has not
been a full election in the Legislature since 1948. Currently, there are
approximately 395 members, 100 of which are newly elected. " " The func-
tion of the Legislative Yuan is to "legislate on behalf of the people."" 5
They also approve of all administrative policies promulgated by the Pres-
ident and the Executive Yuan." 6
The Judicial Yuan is headed by a President and Vice President who
are appointed by the National President. These officers handle the ad-
ministrative details of the Judicial Yuan. There are also 17 Grand Jus-
tices appointed by the National President who serve as Justices in the
highest court of appeals. The Grand Justices have the power to interpret
the Constitution and declare that laws passed by the Legislative Yuan are
in violation of its parameters. "
The Examination Yuan is headed by a President and Vice President
who are also appointed by the National President. Their functions in-
clude proctoring the Civil Service examination and administering the
workings of the civil service organization for the government." 8
The final branch is the Control Yuan. This body is comprised of 223
elected members from Mongolia, Tibet, and Chinese residence abroad.
Currently, there are 74 members serving in the Control Yuan." 9 The
functions of the Control Yuan are to review the laws and policies of the
other branches then either consent, censor, or audit their decisions. They
also have limited power of impeachment.120
B. Legal Philosophy
The philosophy guiding the Government of the Republic of China is
based upon the teachings of Sun Yat-Sen. During his battle against impe-
rialism, Dr. Sun developed and argued the merits of the "three principle's
of the people." These principles guide the decisions of the ROC leaders
today. 1 2' The three principles include min tsu, min chuan, and min
sheng. Loosely translated, Min tsu means nationalism. This principle em-
bodies the strong sense of loyalty the ROC has toward its land and peo-
ple. This is one reason why they still insist upon reunification with the
mainland even though it may not be in their best interest economically. 2 '
113. Id.
114. Id. at 98.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 101.
118. Id. at 103.
119. Id. at 109.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 73.
122. Id. at 74; M. LASATER, supra note 5, at 119.
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Min chuan is the Chinese word for sovereignty. When used in this
context, however, it means considerably more, standing also for the pur-
suit of democracy. Unlike Jean Jacques Rousseau, Dr. Sun believed de-
mocracy is not the natural organization of society, but is a condition
which must be constantly strived for by all people. ' The concept of the
five yuan of government exemplifies the government structures needed to
prevent the monopolization of power by one person thus insuring the
growth of democracy in society.
The final principle is min sheng or livelihood. Dr. Sun believed that
working for one's livelihood was the driving force in social progress.'"
This is best illustrated by the tremendous progress made by the
Taiwanese in developing their economy and domestic social system.2 '
C. Political Parties
An interesting change is currently taking place in Taiwan regarding
the structure of Taiwan's political parties. While multiple parties are not
prohibited by law in the ROC, there has traditionally been only one dom-
inate party, the Kuomintang (KMT). Founded by Dr. Sun who led the
revolution in 1911, control of the party passed to President Chiang Kai-
Shek who fled to Taiwan during the Communist Revolution in 1949. Be-
cause full elections haven't been held since that time, the KMT still con-
trols well over a three-fourths majority in all the elected bodies in the
government." 6 A few minority parties, the Young Chinese Party and the
Chinese Democratic Socialist Party, have also held a few seats in each
elected assembly. 12 7
In the 1986 elections, a new opposition party, the Democratic Pro-
gressive Party emerged on the political agenda. They won substantial
support in the population by running on a platform of "self-determina-
tion" for the people of Taiwan. 2 8 Although advocating independence
from the mainland is still illegal in Taiwan, the ideas of self-determina-
tion and increased representation for the Taiwanese in the legislature are
gaining support from the population and in the government.'2 9 Even the
new President, a member of the KMT, is a native Taiwanese. It is be-
lieved that with the ground swell of popular support for self-determina-
tion, the KMT will have to modify its positions regarding reunification
with the mainland or risk losing control of the government they have
worked so hard to maintain.
123. CHINA, supra note 2, at 74. See generally J. RoussEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND
DISCOURSES (trans. H. Cole, 1762).
124. CHINA, supra note 2, at 74.
125. See generally M. LASATER, supra note 5, at 114.
126. CHINA, supra note 2, at 116.
127. Id. at 117-19. As of 1983 the Young Chinese Party held 64 seats in the National
Assembly and the Chinese Democratic Socialist Party held 35.




V. LEGAL CONFLICTS WHICH MAY HINDER REUNIFICATION EFFORTS
This final section will discuss some of the concerns expressed by Chi-
nese legal scholars regarding the possible reunification of both Hong
Kong and Taiwan with the PRC.
A. Hong Kong And The PRC
1. Philosophical Differences
As discussed previously, the purpose of laws in Western society is to
protect the individual from the tyranny of the government. The laws are
codified to minimize the arbitrary conduct of power holders.' 30 By way of
contrast, the Chinese believe strongly in moral right and wrong (li). They
believe in customary notions of behavioral norms and do not feel a need
to codify laws reflecting these norms. They enact laws only when they
need to elicit some sort of change in the societal norms (fa). Laws in the
PRC are "political instruments" of the state, explicitly designed to
achieve certain objectives.131 While the Joint Declaration expressly pro-
vides for the power of final adjudication to be vested in the Hong Kong
courts as well as the preservation of the common law system, a potential
problem arises when these laws conflict with the Basic Law as drafted by
the PRC.132 In a judicial case where the issue to be decided involves the
interpretation of the Basic Law, the decision of the Hong court must be
certified to the Chief Executive or the PRC Standing Committee and the
answer provided must be adhered to by the Hong Kong courts.' The
question then arises: Who decides whether a decision of the court contra-
venes the Basic Law? The Joint Declaration is silent on this particular
issue."' Under common law, that decision should be left to the judiciary,
under Socialist rule, the legislature should decide. As drafted in the Basic
Law, the Hong Kong SAR is vested with independent judicial power, in-
cluding that of final adjudication. However, the Hong Kong courts will
have no jurisdiction over cases relating to the "acts of state." The Courts
of the region must obtain a statement from the Chief Executive on ques-
tions concerning the acts of the state, whenever such questions arise in a
legal proceeding. This statement will be binding on the courts.13 5 The
question of who decides what an "act of state" is has not yet been an-
130. Mushkat, supra, note 37, at 174.
131. Id.
132. Agreement, supra note 11, at art. 3(3).
133. Tamanaha, Post-1997 Hong Kong: A Comparative Study of the Meaning of "High
Degree of Autonomy," 20 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 41, 54 (1989-90).
134. Cheng, The Constitutional Relationship Between the Central Government and
the Future Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, 20 CASE W. REs. J.
INT'L L. 65, 79 (1988). See also Agreement, supra note 11, Annex 1(2).
135. The Basic Law, supra note 22, art. 19. The Basic Law goes on to state that the
Chief Executive shall obtain the certificate from the Central People's Government of the
PRC. See also Cheng, supra note 134, at 80.
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swered by the Basic Law.
2. Constitutional Conflicts
The Joint Declaration states that Hong Kong will become a Special
Administrative Region "in accordance with the provisions of Article 31 of
the Constitution of the People's Republic of China."' 36 While the Basic
Law is given elevated status in the hierarchy of laws in the PRC, it is still
subject to conformity with the PRC Constitution." The preamble and
the first several articles of the general principles section of the PRC Con-
stitution advocate pure socialism.138 Article 67 of the PRC Constitution is
also in direct contrast with the claim that an SAR can be autonomous. 13 9
This article gives the National People's Congress power to annul local
and regional regulations which conflict with the ideals and provisions of
the Constitution. 40 Since these ideas include socialism, any system which
conflicts with socialist principles has the potential to be annulled by the
National People's Congress. Obviously, there is shaky ground at best for
the stability of the SARs under the current version of the Chinese
Constitution.
3. Enforcement of the Joint Declaration
Since the PRC has never admitted to not having sovereignty over
Hong Kong,'" the question remains as to whether the Declaration would
be considered a valid international agreement subject to enforcement by
the International Court of Justice. Under the internationally accepted
definition of "treaty," the general consensus is that it is a valid interna-
tional agreement.
This conclusion rests on the fact that the Joint Declaration falls
within the established definition of an international treaty as incorpo-
rated in Article 2 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
This definition equates a treaty with "an international agreement con-
cluded between states in written form and governed by international law,
whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instru-
ments and whatever its particular designation."' 4 2
Even assuming the agreement is valid internationally, enforcement
will be difficult considering Great Britain will give up all physical control
136. Agreement, supra note 11, art. 3(1).
137. Cheng, supra note 134, at 66. The Basic Law can not be contravened by adminis-
trative rules and regulations of the PRC. The Basic Law, "only has to be in accord with the
Constitution."
138. Remarks, supra note 35, at 355. See also PRC CoNss., supra note 6, preamble.
139. PRC CoNsT., supra note 6, art. 67; Agreement, supra note 11, art. 3(2).
140. Remarks, supra note 35, at 356.
141. Agreement, supra note 11, art. 1. The declaration states the PRC, "has decided to
resume the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong"(emphasis added).
142. Mushkat, supra note 37, at 191. See generally Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N.Doc. A/Conf.39/27, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
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over the Hong Kong territories and the PRC has not accepted the com-
pulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.""3 As mentioned
previously, however, the Chinese do consider treaties the primary source
of international law and the principle of pacta sunt servanda is hailed by
the Chinese as an important factor in treaty law.1" What remains to be
seen is exactly how the PRC will interpret the Joint Declaration and
whether that interpretation conforms to the interpretation by the rest of
the world.
4. Restraint and Compromise are Needed
Other than the possible threat of international economic retaliation,
the Chinese seem to have absolute control over the fate of Hong Kong.
Certainly it is in their best interest, economically and politically, to main-
tain the Hong Kong system with as much stability as possible.'45 To ef-
fect this stability, a certain amount of compromise will be required by the
PRC as well as by Hong Kong. As the situation stands, Hong Kong will
be at the mercy of the severe swings in political thought which tend to
occur in the PRC." '4 Only through open dialogue and consensus will the
people of Hong Kong and the rest of the world gain faith in the future of
Hong Kong as one of the financial capitals of the world.
B. Taiwan And The PRC
1. Political Biases
The first step which must be taken to begin Taiwan's reunification
with the mainland is to reconcile the deep political biases which these two
governments share. More than ninety-five percent of the people on Tai-
wan are originally from mainland China. They share the same language
and have inherited the same culture and way of life. 47 However, the
memories of the harshness of the Communist Revolution which drove
them from their homes in 1949 are still very vivid. There is a widespread
fear in Taiwan that if reunification occurs, Beijing will eventually impose
socialist rule on the island.14 8 Another equally important reason for Tai-
wan's reluctance to negotiate for reunification is the state of the PRC's
economy. Many Taiwanese scholars believe reunification with the main-
land at this time would undermine the Taiwanese economy.'4 9 There is
fear that talks would undermine investor and foreign confidence in Tai-
wan. Also, as was evident in Hong Kong, the fear of reverse technology
143. Remarks, supra note 35, at 352.
144. Id. at 352.
145. Note, International Agreements, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 249, 252 (1985); Cheng,
supra note 134, at 95.
146. Note, supra note 10, at 336; Cheng, supra note 134, at 75.
147. M. LASATER, supra note 5, at 111.
148. Id. at 144. See also Remarks, supra note 35, at 359.
149. M. LASATER, SUPRA note 5, at 119.
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transfers (i.e., "brain drain") has been a significant hinderance in the de-
cision regarding whether or not to negotiate with the PRC. Finally, the
perception of the communists is so bad in Taiwan, any signs of concilia-
tion by the Taiwanese government would most definitely cause the people
of Taiwan to distrust the government. 50
The differences between the Nationalist Government on Taiwan and
the PRC are deeper than the conflicting economic and political systems.
Each was committed for decades to a "war of words," insisting that his-
tory and experience would vindicate its position regarding the best means
for the political and economic development of China.1'5 Therefore, most
Taiwanese seem content to remain with the status quo for the time
being. 52
2. Economic Ties
Both the PRC and Taiwan stand to lose a great deal economically if
they do not open up the trade lines between their respective regions. In
the period between 1979 and 1987, entreport trade between the mainland
and Taiwan via Hong Kong was valued at $5.5 billion U.S. dollars, includ-
ing $1.1 billion of goods from the mainland and $4.4 billion from Tai-
wan. '53 This trend has increased every year. In 1988 alone, indirect trade
through Hong Kong jumped fifty-nine percent. 54
This trade, which mostly benefits Taiwan, is hindered by the many
obstructions Taiwan has installed regarding trade with the PRC.15
Taiwanese authorities continue to adhere to the practice of "indirect,
non-governmental trade with the mainland." As a result, most of the
trade which takes place between the two governments goes through Hong
Kong.' 56 When Hong Kong becomes a part of the PRC in 1997, this trade
will technically have to end. In order to maintain and increase their eco-
nomic relations with the mainland, Taiwan will have to repeal their trade
restrictions and allow direct trade with the mainland.
3. Philosophical Differences
The principles of Socialism and the "Three People's Principles" are
in direct conflict. While both embody the concept of Nationalism, they
espouse opposite views regarding the governing of the people.' 57 Democ-
racy and socialism differ in many respects, the most significant being the
placement of power within the government structure. While in a democ-
150. Id. at 120.
151. Remarks, supra note 35, at 358.
152. N.Y. Times, supra at 17.
153. Dahong, Mainland-Taiwan Economic Relations on the Rise, BEIJING REV., May
22-28, 1989, at 23,. 25.
154. Christ. Sci. Mon., supra at 32.
155. Dahong, supra note 153, at 27.
156. Id.
157. CHINA, supra note 2, at 74.
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racy checks and balances are used to prevent possible abuses of power, a
socialist country vests the government's power in a single body which
governs for the betterment of the state as a whole. There is no possible
way to resolve the many differences between Socialism and Democracy.
For true reunification of these governments to occur, one or the other will
have to compromise their philosophy. After such a protracted battle, it
will be extremely difficult for either side to just "lay down their arms;"
and at this point, neither of them will.158
4. Enforcement of a Reunification Agreement
Given the possibility that these two governments did come to a writ-
ten agreement regarding reunification, what are the possible enforcement
mechanisms available? A stark difference between this situation and that
of Hong Kong's exists which makes the outcome unclear. The object of
the Joint Declaration was a territory which both governments claimed a
limited right to govern. Conversely, both the PRC and Taiwan claim
there is only one China to which Taiwan belongs. In this scenario, both
governments claim they are the legitimate government of all of China. A
reunification agreement between Taiwan and the PRC would probably be
deemed domestic in nature, not international. Thus, such an agreement
would not be subject to any enforcement mechanisms of the international
community.'59 To ensure international enforcement of the agreement,
both governments will first have to declare themselves separate interna-
tional entities. This is something both have refused to do thus far.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since the Joint Declaration has already been signed, the above dis-
cussion regarding Hong Kong is purely academic. Hong Kong has no
choice but to become part of the PRC. What will be of interest in the
future is how the PRC reacts to each of the above mentioned problems. If
the problems are ignored, they are likely to cause serious political and
social unrest in the PRC and Hong Kong. If the PRC compromises and
allows Hong Kong to actually govern itself with regard to domestic issues,
the world, and especially Taiwan, will probably have a much greater re-
spect and trust for the PRC and its offers for reunification.
With regard to Taiwan, if reunification ever occurs between Taiwan
and the PRC, it will either be the result of a military conquest, or the
result of substantial political change in the PRC. Since Taiwan has every-
thing to loose and very little to gain by reunification, it is not likely to
occur soon.
The success or failure of these reunification efforts lies almost pri-
marily on the political winds in the PRC. While the PRC can not effec-
tively cut itself off from the world economically like it did in the 1950's, it
158. Remarks, supra note 35, at 358.
159. Id. at 354.
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can continue to stifle political change and force a strong hand on Hong
Kong's internal affairs. Recent history leads me to believe this will not be
the case. Each of the last five or six waves of democratic activism in the
PRC has directly inspired the future leaders of the nation toward greater
openness.' If the PRC hopes to continue on its road to economic pros-
perity, it must start loosening its grip on the Chinese people. For as mil-
lions of Chinese so vividly demonstrated once again, "men and women do
not live by rice alone. ' '161
The over 2000 year history of the Chinese empire has been filled with
many events. Too often the negative moments overshadow the many posi-
tive contributions the Chinese have made to better our society. It is the
hope of everyone that the PRC has learned the many valuable lessons of
the past, and will continue to strive toward greater openness and demo-
cratic freedom in the future.6 2
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